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DERRIDA AND COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY 
Steven Burik 
Singapore Management University 
 
ABSTRACT 
This article argues that Derrida’s thinking is relevant to comparative philosophy. To illustrate 
this, at various stages classical Daoism is compared with Derrida’s thought, to highlight 
Derrida’s ‘applicability’ and to see how using Derrida can contribute to new interpretations 
of Daoism. The article first looks into Derrida’s engagement (or lack thereof) with non-
Western thought, and then proceed to his extensive work regarding language and translation, 
comparing this with views on classical Chinese language and translation of key Daoist 
characters. I then explore Derrida’s efforts at opening up philosophy to its outside, and argue 
that he was very much concerned with other ways of thinking and their possible influence on 
Western thought. Lastly I argue that Derrida’s abiding concern with otherness and alterity 
forms a fertile background from which to reinvestigate traditional interpretations of classical 
Daoism, and argue that employing his way of thought can lead us to interesting new 
perspectives on Daoism.  
 
KEY WORDS: Jacques Derrida, comparative philosophy, Daoism, Chinese 
philosophy, language 
 
 
We stand opposed to whatever would prohibit philosophy from . . . opening 
itself up to new objects in a way that knows no limit of principle, from 
recalling that it was already present there where no one wanted to 
acknowledge it. (Derrida 2004, 170)  
 
This article argues for the relevance of Jacques Derrida’s thought for comparative philosophy 
in two ways. I will first argue that although, to my knowledge, Derrida himself has never 
made any serious efforts in the discipline of comparative philosophy, we can nevertheless 
fruitfully employ his way of thinking to further our understanding of comparative philosophy, 
as well as provide criticism against certain ways of reading philosophical texts from different 
cultures. In short, I will argue that Derrida’s work gives us much to think about when 
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attempting to do comparative philosophy, and can offer us a more appropriate Western 
resource with which to approach non-Western philosophical texts, especially when we look at 
Derrida’s work on language and translation, and his focus on ‘interdependence’ or 
‘relationality.’  Second, and to illustrate Derrida’s relevance to comparative philosophy, I will 
use his thought to compare with classical Daoism, to criticise some of the traditional 
metaphysical interpretations of the classical Daoist texts and to see how reading Daoism 
using Derrida’s angle clears the way for a non-metaphysical interpretation of Daoism. 
 
Introduction 
 
Given that Derrida is most well-known for criticising the tradition of Western metaphysics 
and for arguing for the interconnectedness and relationality of what seem to be separate 
identities at first glance, it is rather surprising that direct references in Derrida’s work to non-
Western or non-metaphysical philosophy are not only sparse, but problematic and ambiguous 
in themselves. This is not to say that Derrida’s work is not highly ‘international.’ He has 
written about South Africa, Algeria, the reception of his work in the United States, and 
numerous other international issues, both philosophical and political. Yet to my knowledge 
there is in none of these works any serious approach to or engagement with other cultures and 
ways of thinking.  
This perceived lack might even render it rather inappropriate to speak of Derrida in 
intercultural perspective. Gayatri Spivak was probably right in the preface to Of 
Grammatology:  
 
The relationship between logocentrism and ethnocentrism is indirectly 
invoked in the very first sentence of the ‘Exergue.’ Yet, paradoxically, and 
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almost by a reverse ethnocentrism, Derrida insists that logocentrism is a 
property of the West. He does this so frequently that a quotation would be 
superfluous. Although something of the Chinese prejudice of the West is 
discussed in Part I, the East is never seriously studied or deconstructed in the 
Derridean text. (Spivak in Derrida 1976, lxxxii, italics in original) 
 
Apart from some places where Derrida includes his own background and the Middle East in 
his writings, there are very few mentions of East Asia or other non-Western places or ways of 
thinking in his extensive oeuvre.1 To be sure, there are a lot of references to the Islamic world 
and to his Algerian roots, and Derrida discusses some of the problematics arising from the 
encounter with these ‘other’ ways of thought. Yet he always insists on pointing out that the 
Middle East is not so different from the West, if we can even make these gross distinctions. 
Derrida has always stressed the common roots of the Abrahamic religions. As such, Derrida 
has questioned the supposed dichotomy between (the Middle) East and West, by arguing first 
that the West is diverse in itself and second that what we consider ‘other’ is not so other as 
we might superficially think. Derrida has convincingly argued that the dominant 
philosophical cultures of the regions of the Judeo-Christian-Islamic sphere have much more 
in common than they differ. For example, in his discussion with Mustafa Chérif, Derrida 
establishes distinctions within the ‘West’ between Europe and America, and questions some 
of the distinctions made between the Islamic and Western world. (see Chérif 2008, 61-66) 
However, when we come to the Far East and Chinese philosophy in particular, it is a 
                                                
1 Although Derrida has criticized Spivak’s reading of his work on Marx, for example in Derrida et al 2008, 222-
224, it would indeed seem that nowhere in Derrida’s extensive oeuvre is there any sustained engagement with 
thinking from other-than Western or Judeo-Christian-Islamic cultures, such as we do for example find in 
Heidegger’s works. Although ethnocentrism is sometimes discussed and Derrida never hesitates to state that this 
ethnocentrism should be overcome, there is no rigorous effort on the part of Derrida to actualise such 
overcoming in an encounter with different cultures. Derrida is usually content to mention the other-than-
Western ways of thinking, and then return to his own project, the deconstruction of Western philosophy. For 
example, see Derrida 1982, 112-113. 
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different story. Although Derrida did visit China once, he has never seriously engaged the 
Chinese philosophical tradition; he does not deconstruct Chinese thought (or any other Asian 
philosophy for that matter). There are only a few passages where China is mentioned. For 
example, in Of Grammatology, Derrida criticises the idea that Chinese as writing was seen in 
the earlier Western interpretations as being in an inferior position with regard to Western 
writing, which, as phonetic, was supposedly closer to the ‘phoneme’ and thus to real meaning 
than the largely ideographic Chinese. Derrida challenges this outdated idea by pointing to the 
fact that “we have known for a long time that largely non-phonetic scripts like Chinese or 
Japanese included phonetic elements very early.” (Derrida 1976, 90) Yet the interesting thing 
about classical Chinese seems to be that these phonetic elements never overtook its 
ideogrammatic structure, and as such classical Chinese never developed into the kind of 
phonetic or alphabetic language we find in the West. This leads Derrida to say that we have 
in the classical Chinese language “the testimony of a powerful movement of civilization 
developing outside of all logocentrism.” (Derrida 1976, 90) However, he seems content to 
stop just there, nothing is done with this observation, and it seems as though Derrida 
continues to treat Chinese as just another way of writing, with the same ideas applying to it. 
Just as any other sign or sign structure, the Chinese characters can also never function 
without iterability and without being different from other characters in the system. The 
Chinese language might be to some extent non-phonetic, but it does not therefore have some 
privileged access to reality.2  
When asked whether logocentrism is a Western phenomenon, Derrida answered that:  
 
logocentric philosophy is a specifically Western response to a much larger 
necessity which also occurs in the Far East and other cultures, that is, the 
                                                
2 See Derrida 1976, 91. 
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phonocentric necessity: the privilege of the voice over writing. … But this 
phonocentric necessity did not develop into a systematic logocentric 
metaphysics in any non-European culture. Logocentrism is a uniquely 
European phenomenon. (Derrida in Kearney 1984, 116-117)3  
 
Again unfortunately Derrida did not further elaborate upon this statement in this Kearney 
interview or elsewhere. In Of Grammatology it seems that Derrida is not denying the link 
between phone and writing in Chinese, but that “it is a question of dislocating, through access 
to another system linking speech and writing [which would be the Chinese system], the 
founding categories of language and the grammar of the episteme.” (Derrida 1976, 92, italics 
in original) This dislocation or disruption of logocentric thought by the idea of non-phonetic 
writing, or at least of a non-phonetic moment or movement in writing, is an important and 
returning issue for Derrida, especially in Of Grammatology, because such an idea “menaces 
substantiality, that other metaphysical name of presence and of ousia. First in the form of the 
substantive. Nonphonetic writing breaks the noun apart. It describes relations and not 
appellations.” (Derrida 1976, 26, italics in original) And this is of course reminiscent of 
différance and its play-structure, the criticisms of both lasting identity and permanent 
substance behind appearance. What non-phonetic writing then suggests to Derrida is the 
possibility of a reinterpretation and revaluation of impermanence and interdependence or 
relationality. This revaluation takes place mostly in Derrida’s extensive work on language 
and is important for comparative philosophy, since in Chinese thought such notions as 
impermanence, interdependence, and relationality feature prominently.4 
 
                                                
3 This point about the universal necessity of phonocentrism is repeated in a 1994 interview (Derrida & Ferraris 
2001, 77) 
4 Although I shall mostly be discussing Daoism, the same applies to a large extent to Confucianism. Thus in 
what follows I beg the reader’s patience when mentioning ‘Chinese philosophy’ and ‘Daoism’ as if they were 
one. My argument is about Daoism, but hopefully can be applied to a lot of Chinese philosophy in general. 
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1. Language, Translation, and Context 
 
One of the most frequently used quotations of Derrida must surely be: “There is nothing 
outside of the text” (Derrida 1976, 158, italics in original), but this is not a statement to the 
effect that we are trapped in language, that we are bound by it, since Derrida understands 
‘text’ as:  
 
limited neither to the graphic, nor to the book, nor even to discourse, and even 
less to the semantic, representational, symbolic, ideal, or ideological sphere. 
What I call “text” implies all the structures called “real,” “economic,” 
“historical,” socio-institutional, in short: all possible referents. … [E]very 
referent, all reality has the structure of a differential trace. (Derrida 1988, 148) 
 
With this Derrida is not denying reference, but argues that to think of ourselves as 
transcendental subjects who could somehow step outside of these referential circles and 
obtain an objective look at them, is a feature of metaphysical thought that others besides 
Derrida have also criticised, and it is in this very tradition that Derrida moves.5 Thus the 
statement that ‘there is nothing outside the text’ means rather that there is always context, and 
this context is both constitutive of our being, as well as structurally open-ended. It is not a 
fixed context, but as the above quote suggests, Derrida rather sees contextuality as inherent in 
all textual structures and as such the referential objectivity espoused in metaphysics would 
become impossible.  
Deconstructions begin by showing that context cannot be neatly contained, and to 
appropriate thinking from different cultures into the traditional Western conceptual 
                                                
5 We can think for example of Nietzsche, Freud, Heidegger, Levinas, and Gadamer, who have all in different 
ways argued against the perceived objectivity of strict metaphysics. 
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frameworks amounts to a futile attempt to contain context. This is especially pertinent in the 
case of Chinese philosophy, which has as one of its core ideas a form of interdependence or 
relationality between things. It becomes imperative then that comparative philosophy takes 
the structurally open-ended contextuality as its basis, and tries to open up its conceptual 
frameworks to move towards the in-between different ways of thought that such contextuality 
creates.  
 Similar concerns surface when we take a closer look at translation, also a major issue 
in comparative philosophy. The traditional project of philosophy has always presupposed and 
looked for meaning or truth behind or beyond words, and thus it has had to presuppose 
translatability, because if there is such a meaning apart from language, any language should 
in principle be equally able (or unable) to describe it. Traditionally seen, translation thus has 
to do with the transfer of meaning. Yet Derrida’s impact lies exactly in the realisation that 
such a meaning is never pure, it is influenced or contaminated by language. Although Derrida 
does of course admit that translations take place, he also denies the ultimate possibility of 
translation, arguing that he does “not believe that translation is a secondary and derived event 
in relation to an original language or text.” (Derrida in Wood & Bernasconi 1988, 5) Derrida 
negates the traditional understanding of translation, precisely because he questions the 
absolute privilege of any original to be translated by some text derivative of it, in a similar 
way as he challenges the priority of speech over writing and the priority of identity over 
difference. Neither the ‘original’ language nor the ‘translation’ language can aspire to any 
pure meaning. So the notion of translation as the simple transfer of a univocal meaning from 
one language to another becomes problematic and needs to be rethought:  
 
…a notion of transformation must be substituted for the notion of translation: 
a regulated transformation of one language by another, of one text by another. 
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We shall not have and never have had to deal with some “transfer” of pure 
signifieds that the signifying instrument—or “vehicle”—would leave virgin 
and intact, from one language to another, or within one and the same language. 
(Derrida 1981, 31, italics in original) 
 
‘Transformation’ is more appropriate as a word for the process Derrida is describing because 
it captures two aspects which ‘translation’ fails to capture. First, because transformation 
implies that there is no original and derivative, both texts can be eternally transformed by 
reading, there is an open-endedness to both. Second, transformation captures the fact of the 
radical ‘violence’ of every translation, in that it always is something different from what is 
translated; as a matter of necessity it transforms instead of merely transfers the ‘original.’ 
 With this questioning of the status of what is traditionally seen as the ‘original’ text, 
Derrida is not so much denying that there is one text which is translated or transformed into 
another, but he is questioning the way the relation between these texts is traditionally 
perceived. He questions the idea that the ‘original’ would mean anything outside of or 
without its (ever expanding) context, which consists precisely of its interpretations and 
translations. He thus argues that: 
 
the so-called original is in a position of demand with regard to the translation. 
The original is not a plenitude which would come to be translated by accident. 
The original is in the situation of demand, that is, of a lack or exile. The 
original is indebted a priori to the translation. Its survival is a demand and a 
desire for translation… (Derrida 1985, 152)6 
                                                
6 Elsewhere Derrida also refers to the necessity of translation for the survival and continuation of the original 
text. For example, in “Des Tours de Babel” in Acts of Religion (Derrida 2002b), Derrida says: “The original is 
the first debtor, the first petitioner; it begins by lacking and by pleading for translation.” (118) And further on: 
“If the translator neither restitutes nor copies an original, it is because the original lives on and transforms itself. 
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Thus, one could speculate that such a survival through the demand of the original for 
translation could be seen as the inevitable and continuing Wirkungsgeschichte of the ‘original’ 
and that this ‘original’ itself would be part of such a Wirkungsgeschichte. Again we see that 
Derrida challenges the idea of a fullness or completeness of any identity (the text to be 
translated), and insists on this identity being relative to difference and interpretation (the text 
translated and as such, living).  
An awareness of this inevitable aspect of transformation of every translation should 
not reduce us to a relativism, but make us see that although a different conceptual framework 
is almost certainly necessary when translating texts from a different cultural background, the 
use of such frameworks should be closely monitored and scrutinised to see how well it fits 
the known dominant cultural sensibilities of the text to be translated. In simpler words, it is 
indeed the case that all translation is interpretation, but certain conceptual frameworks are 
less appropriate to translate sensibilities from for example the classical Chinese philosophical 
texts, since such frameworks import or imply a worldview known to be largely irrelevant or 
not importantly present in the classical Chinese culture. Roger Ames and David Hall, in their 
numerous collaborations, have argued convincingly that an uncritical use of the conceptual 
framework of Western philosophy to translate Chinese classics inevitably leads to a distortion 
of the way the classical Chinese thinkers perceived their world, the context in which these 
classics arose. 
 So the real problem for comparative philosophy is not that every translation is a 
transformation or interpretation, but that this interpretation “does not begin … with what is 
commonly called translation. It begins as soon as a certain type of reading of the ‘original’ 
text is instituted.” (Derrida 2004, 19, italics added) How we read is what causes certain 
                                                                                                                                                  
The translation will truly be a moment in the growth of the original, which will complete itself in enlarging 
itself.” (121) 
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interpretations to flourish and others to wither. Taking this problem to comparative 
philosophy it would seem that our ideas of communication and language are not neutral, but 
might nevertheless appear or be presented as such. There is no neutral or meta-language, 
since “philosophy finds its element in so-called natural language. It has never been able to 
formalize itself integrally in an artificial language despite several fascinating attempts to do 
so in the history of philosophy.” (Derrida 1995, 225) In comparative philosophy one set or 
kind of these natural languages, the Western metaphysical one, has until recently always 
presented itself as the model to which other languages have to concur or aspire. Speaking of 
‘public communication’ Derrida has thus warned us that: 
 
Such a discourse tends to impose a model of language that is supposedly 
favourable to this communication. Claiming to speak in the name of 
intelligibility, good sense, common sense, or the democratic ethic, this 
discourse tends, by means of these very things, and as if naturally, to discredit 
anything that complicates this model. (Derrida 1992, 55)  
 
Ways of thinking that are not easily incorporated into the dominant model might then easily 
be excluded on the basis of lacking certain criteria, and we should be aware that it is our 
Western metaphysical languages and way of thinking that have imposed and instituted those 
criteria. Derrida is extremely aware of this dissymmetry, and thus of the difficulties of 
translation, and of the seemingly impossible “necessity in fact of making cohabit in a same 
text or of grafting codes, motifs, registers, voices that are heterogeneous” (Derrida 1995, 375), 
which for my current purposes I read as coming from different cultural and linguistic 
backgrounds.  
In the rest of this section, I will argue that the ingrained categories of Western 
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metaphysics are challenged by the Chinese language structure, not so much because Chinese 
writing does not have a link to speech, but because this link seems structurally different and 
therefore does not admit of the radical prioritising of speech over writing or of seeing writing 
as a defective derivative of speech. In this context it is worthwhile to look at some 
interpretations of classical Chinese by contemporary philosophers. Henry Rosemont Jr. and 
Roger Ames argue that: 
 
classical Chinese is not now and may never have been understood aloud as a 
primarily spoken language; therefore spoken and literary Chinese are now and 
may always have been two distinct linguistic media, and if so, the latter should 
clearly not be seen as simply a transcription of speech. (Ames & Rosemont 
1998, 38-39) 
 
Classical Chinese differs significantly from the linguistic ideal of Indo-European languages, 
in that it cannot be understood (exclusively) by seeing it as a transcription of the spoken 
language, whereby the pure presence denoted by the spoken word is transported (in a 
deficient way) into the written word. According to Roger Ames and David Hall this means 
that classical “Chinese language is not logocentric. Words do not name essences. Rather, they 
indicate always-transitory processes and events.” (Hall & Ames 2001, 16) And Chad Hansen, 
another prominent Chinese philosophy scholar, has argued that we just deny the bias towards 
speech and see (the classical Chinese) language in its totality (that is both speech and writing) 
as:  
 
an abstract symbolic system. Sounds are one familiar example of linguistic 
symbols, not their essence. Pictures, gestures, electromagnetic modulations, 
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graphs, map conventions, eyebrow movements, ideographs, logical notation 
and so forth are other possible symbol systems that can token words of a 
language. (Hansen 1992, 37, italics in original) 
 
These views on language are important to the project of comparative philosophy, since it is in 
language that intercultural encounters take place,7 and Derrida seems to be suggesting that 
Western conceptuality is not suitable for such encounters:  
 
What then, is this encounter with the absolutely-other? Neither representation, 
nor limitation, nor conceptual relation to the same. … [T]he concept (material 
of language), which is always given to the other, cannot encompass the other, 
cannot include the other. (Derrida 2001, 117, italics in original) 
 
Although this quote is about Levinas’ ideas of the absolutely other, we can extrapolate this to 
intercultural encounters. If the Chinese language and worldview are relevantly different from 
that of the West, and if Western conceptuality is inappropriate for such an intercultural 
encounter with the philosophy of classical China, we should find some examples of how this 
conceptuality distorts the other culture’s way of thought. Luckily (or rather unfortunately) we 
have many such examples in the Western translations of certain characters pivotal to the 
classical Chinese way of thought. Characters such as dao 道  have traditionally been 
translated with the substantive noun ‘Way’, capitalised in order to create the idea of a 
metaphysical principle equal to ‘Reason’, or even ‘God.’ But dao also means a host of other 
things, including ‘guiding discourse’ and ‘speaking.’8 Choosing this one translation over any 
                                                
7 Not just in written language, but even more so in language in a broad sense, when we take Derrida’s idea of 
‘writing,’ as encompassing all sign structures of signification, as a substitute for language. 
8 For a good gloss of the richness of the notion dao see Hall and Ames 2003, 57-59. 
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other possibility thus incorporates a metaphysics that the Chinese thinkers may not have 
shared. A similar thing has happened to the character tian 天, usually translated as ‘Heaven.’ 
It is only quite recently that the realisation has set in that such a translation imports a whole 
world of religious sentiments largely unfamiliar to the classical Chinese.9 As a last example, 
the character xin 心 has always been translated as ‘mind’, incorporating as such the mind-
body dualism that is largely absent from Chinese philosophy. The character xin 心 is actually 
more a representation of the aorta, so ‘heart’ would be more appropriate, especially when we 
know that for the classical Chinese the heart was considered the seat of thinking. Nowadays 
the not so pretty but effective ‘heart-mind’ is often used, which at least does not lead us to 
import the mind-body distinction into Chinese thought. 
More importantly, from these short examples we can see that by applying our own 
categories and conceptuality, we not only distort the meaning of certain words, but in the 
process import an entirely different way of thinking into the Chinese classics. It could be 
suggested that applying a conceptual framework is inevitable. Although this is true, it would 
not be the case that every conceptual framework or interpretation is as good as the next one. 
Those frameworks and interpretations that reflect the situation at hand best are those that are 
obviously better than the ones that do not reflect it. In the Chinese worldview, meaning is 
situational and relational and is developed ‘from the inside’ by metaphorically relating the 
situation to similar ones, and thus meaning cannot easily be abstracted, but is always 
contextual. More importantly, the Chinese philosophical outlook sees the world in a process 
way, where things are not static and isolatable, but are contextual events that have no fixed 
beginning and end, but are rather part of a web of interconnected happenings. As such the 
largely metaphysical Western framework with its focus on abstraction, identification, and 
classification, seems indeed inappropriate. 
                                                
9 See Hall and Ames 1998. 
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In Limited Inc. Derrida explains the profound contextuality or relationality inherent in 
his thought by saying “that nothing exists outside context …, but also that the limit of the 
frame or the border of the context always entails a clause of non-closure. The outside 
penetrates and thus determines the inside.” (Derrida 1988, 152-153) Thus context itself is not 
only constitutive of any identity, but as context it can never be closed off, it is structurally 
and inherently open. Naming it ‘the’ context would even be wrong, as this could still suggest 
a closed context with an identifiable content. Similarly, translating dao as ‘the Way’ ignores 
the fact that dao is largely processual, and in a way it is similar to context, of which Derrida 
says it is nothing more or less than “the entire ‘real-history-of-the-world.’” (Derrida 1988, 
136) In this regard dao is like context as chapter 62 of the Daodejing says that “Way-making 
(dao) is the flowing together of all things (wanwu).” (Hall & Ames 2003, 173, pinyin in 
original) 
So when comparative philosophy is not well served by referring to the metaphysical 
conceptual frameworks, it is necessary to enlarge the philosophical discourse. This is what 
Derrida has attempted in numerous ways, as he is interested in freeing thinking from what has 
become the too stringent metaphysical and analytical philosophy. He cares “about… a 
‘thinking,’ let’s say, that is not confined within the particular way of thinking that is 
philosophy or science. There are forms …, there are perhaps “pensées” that are more thinking 
than this kind of thinking called philosophy.” (Derrida 1995, 202, French in original) This 
move reminds us of Heidegger’s statement that there might be “greater thinkers” (Heidegger 
1963, 24) outside of Western philosophy. Derrida’s deconstructions entail a thinking which is 
no longer purely philosophical, or it is differently philosophical, in that it questions the 
traditionally philosophical from various standpoints which are themselves not necessarily 
philosophical in the traditional sense. Such deconstructions are “perhaps no longer scientific 
or philosophical, in the sense in which these words can be determined today. It is in fact this 
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indetermination and this very opening that we designate … by the word “thinking.”” (Derrida 
2004, 202-203)  
I would suggest that one of the functions of comparative philosophy is similar, in that 
in and through its comparisons it questions the standard conceptions, interpretations and 
explanations that traditional Western metaphysics has offered, from a place in-between 
different philosophical traditions, and that means first of all that culturally different 
paradigms of thinking need to be confident that their ideas will not be appropriated by 
traditional Western metaphysics, and second that the relationality between different 
philosophical traditions be reconsidered. 
Given these imperatives it has been thought by many that comparative philosophy is 
quite literally ‘impossible.’ The fact that the traditional conceptual frameworks from the West 
and China are so different, or that it may not even be possible to speak of ‘conceptual 
framework’ when discussing the Chinese language and thought, has persuaded many that 
‘real’ intercultural dialogue is impossible, since the conceptual frameworks are too different. 
The only way comparative philosophy seems to be possible is if we willingly see its 
impossibility. Let me explain this: we must admit that different conceptual frameworks such 
as the Western metaphysical and the classical Chinese are in a way incompatible. As we saw 
in the translation part of this article, we are always transforming rather than transferring. 
However, awareness of this impossibility of pure transfer need not preclude any comparative 
efforts. First of all, such efforts are there, and continue to yield interesting and insightful 
comparisons. The fact that they do not achieve such a pure transfer is only a problem if one 
thinks of philosophy as a pure and objective endeavour, as traditional metaphysics has done. 
Second, and connected to this, there may be other conceptual frameworks that are more 
appropriate to the cultural sensibilities of classical Chinese thought. One such framework 
could be the one that stresses a non-metaphysical, process way of thinking.  
16 
 
 
2. Interdependence, Relationality and the Process World 
 
Derrida has argued that things are never as neatly containable as the metaphysical approach 
would want. This observation can be translated into the necessity for our dominant, but 
limited way of thinking to seek discourse with different ways of thinking (be they Eastern or 
Western in origin). Indeed, this necessity can be read throughout Derrida’s work, which is 
precisely concerned with boundaries, limits, limitations and with their artificiality, and argues 
incessantly for the traversal and disruption of these limits. First of all we have seen there is 
the sense of disruption which we see in the fact that nothing is ever so full and complete as it 
might present itself. Secondly Derrida takes this idea of traversal as a kind of deconstructive 
imperative. So he observes not just the inevitability of the first kind of traversal, but closely 
connected to this argues for the necessity of philosophy to go beyond its own limits, “toward 
the encounter with other types of knowledge, discourse, writing.” (Derrida 1995, 376) It is 
only by going through what is ‘other’ that thinking works. The traditional universalistic 
tendencies in Western philosophy could then be seen as having denied or belittled the 
necessity of this encounter. Derrida argues that the Euro- or ethnocentrism involved in a lot 
of what is called philosophy should be challenged both from within and from without, and 
argues for an approach to other forms of thought that would go beyond the usual oppositional 
structure of Eurocentric\non-Eurocentric. (Derrida 2002a, 336-338) 
Derrida’s work is thus important for comparative philosophy, as it challenges 
preconceived notions of truth, reference, identity and wholeness or completeness, thus 
opening the way for a new understanding of relationality and difference. But as we have seen, 
Derrida’s challenges were largely ‘from within’, whereas in comparative philosophy we can 
find a challenge ‘from without.’ Geoffrey Bennington has observed that for Derrida, “[t]he 
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point … is not to reintegrate remains into philosophy, but … to introduce a radical 
nondialectisable alterity into the heart of the same.” (Derrida & Bennington 1993, 291) This 
means Derrida was implicitly aware of the necessity of giving comparative thinking a 
recognised space. The ‘incursions,’ ‘invasions,’ ‘disruptions,’ translation problems etc. from 
outside of philosophy into its field ‘proper,’ need to be addressed by philosophy, not by 
closing itself off from what is considered other to it, but by opening up to these different 
ways of thought. 
This same point is driven home when Derrida argues that deconstruction as a 
discipline does not really exist. Instead, he says, there are deconstructions,10 indicating that 
these are site-specific. This means that Derrida argues that any strict methodology would 
beforehand be closed off to the situational aspect of each new engagement. As he says, it 
would reduce deconstruction(-s) to “an available set of rule-governed procedures, methods, 
accessible approaches.” (Derrida 2007, 15) In comparative philosophy there is still the 
(maybe traditionally Western) wish to come up with one method, theory, or methodology of 
comparative philosophy. By employing Derrida’s thoughts, we should rather let this wish go 
and focus on the individual encounters and comparisons without imposing a fixed, 
preconceived idea of what comparative philosophy should be. 
This leads us back to the already briefly mentioned notion of (the) ‘other’ or alterity 
in Derrida’s work, a difficult but persistent theme.11 The problem with the other seems to be 
how it can possibly have any effect on the self, since if it is considered as the other of 
language, then it is also the other of all our reference structures, and thus would be 
inaccessible, i.e. impossible. Derrida has even said: “Every other is completely other.” 
(Derrida 1993, 22) We seem to be back at the relativist position that says that comparative 
philosophy is impossible. Yet what is ‘other’ might always escape our efforts at appropriation, 
                                                
10 See for example Derrida in Lotringer & Cohen 2001, 15. 
11 See J. Hillis Miller 1996. 
18 
 
but at the same time otherness, difference, seems constitutive of our being while remaining 
ever singular and evasive. The relevance for comparative thinking is that what is other is 
never really so radically other as not to allow some sort of communication or encounter, yet 
this encounter can never take the form of appropriation. 
I take Derrida to mean with the ‘other’ that this ‘other’ is then not something we can 
summon in nor into our language, our conceptuality; it is rather something which has to come 
of its own, “[y]et it is necessary to prepare for it; to allow the coming of the entirely other, 
passivity, a certain kind of resigned passivity for which everything comes down to the same, 
is not suitable. Letting the other come is not inertia ready for anything whatever.” (Derrida 
2007, 39) This reminds us immediately of Heidegger’s Gelassenheit. Gelassenheit is not a 
passive attitude; it is an active opening up of your own thought structures which is necessary 
for other ways of thinking to find an entrance. Derrida argues for a similar attitude, a 
responsible opening. The difference with Heidegger could be that it is actually 
deconstruction(s) which provide such possible openings. Thus the space created by opening 
up our thought structures, by deconstructing what is supposedly an identity, is what makes 
any intercultural encounter between the self and the other possible. 
Alterity and outside are not to be subsumed under traditional philosophical categories, 
they are to remain outside so as to upset the comfort of the inside. They are however 
necessarily part of the larger thinking discourse, and should be given the space to develop ‘on 
their own terms.’ In Daoism, this is similarly perceived in terms of spontaneity and non-
interference with the way the world is. The Daoist terminology of ziran自然 (spontaneity, 
so-of-itself) and wuwei 無為 (non-assertive action) seeks to express this attitude of openness 
and respectful responsiveness to the world that we also see in Derrida. 
 
3. A Derridean Approach to Daoism 
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My point in this last section is largely illustrative. I only wish to establish that it is very much 
possible to take a Derridean, differential or non-dualistic approach to Daoism, and that doing 
so is not (just) imposing Derrida’s standards on the Daoist tradition (at least not more so than 
‘normal’ interpretations impose their metaphysical ideas on them), but is a better reflection of 
the Daoist sensibilities. Such a non-metaphysical interpretation can, as I will show, (also) be 
read in the texts (and in differing commentaries and interpretations) themselves, in the 
ambiguity or equivocality, or polysemy (dissemination) of the ‘concepts’ that are found in 
Daoism.  
We saw that in Daoism, with its process character, meaning has to arise, not from 
some outside metaphysical principle, but from within the process, and hence the insistence 
and focus on relationality. Meaning here arises from context. The structure of the classical 
Chinese language seems to play at least a part in this. The traditional Western temptation has 
always been to absolutise in a logocentric manner the ‘ideas’ and ‘concepts’ of East Asian 
traditions (an example we saw being The Dao in capital letters translated as ‘The Way’ 
according to the reifying and ‘substance-thinking’ Western standards) and this temptation is 
apparent both in Western and subsequent Asian readings and interpretations of the Daoist 
tradition.  
 The resistance against this kind of reading could be a match between Derrida and 
classical Daoism. With regard to Daoism this would mean that dao is not some metaphysical 
principle, but it is rather the structures of relationality, of context. This kind of thought can be 
read in the Zhuangzi: Zhuangzi, upon realising he is himself entangled in a web of creatures 
preying upon each other, says that “[i]t is inherent in things that they are ties to each other, 
that one kind calls up another.” (Graham 2001, 118) Zhuangzi thereby assents to the fact that 
he is a situational being. Graham’s translation here might at first seem odd, as he translates 
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not that things have ties with other things, but that things are these ties. This translation 
however makes it even clearer that relationality is prior to identity.  
Consulting Derrida’s work on translation can help us make more sense of the fact that 
there is really no one meaning to the original Daoist classics, but that meaning only arises out 
of interpretations, something which the actual Wirkungsgeschichte or evolution of the Daoist 
texts through their commentaries and interpretations endorses. We have known for a long 
time that the Daoist classics are not one-author works but rather compilations of multiple 
sources, and that their final appearance is the result of a long process of coming to be through 
various permutations and interpretations, where later commentators would sometimes 
literally insert their own comments into the text they were commenting on. 
 A Derridean reading would consist in different translation strategies, where a term 
like dao will not get translated as “The Way,” but for example, as done by Roger Ames and 
David Hall, as “way-making” (Hall & Ames 2003), indicating a non-metaphysical process 
thinking in Daoism rather than a substance thinking. We could then proceed to reinterpret 
classical Daoism, i.e. the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi, according to these different 
understandings of their background assumptions. Characters such as tian 天, ziran自然, 
wuwei 無為, xin 心, which are very important in Daoism, would also have to be translated 
differently, something Ames and Hall consequently do.12 
To illustrate the compatibility between Derrida and Daoism I would like to focus on 
the notion of ‘trace.’ Derrida employs many terms with regard to this ‘trace’ thinking, which 
have definite parallels to dao, if read as way-making. In this context ‘breaching’ (Bahnung 
(German) or Frayage (French)) is important in Derrida’s thought. ‘Spacing’ and ‘supplement’ 
are other terms used here. In my view these terms stand for the play of otherness, of 
differences, that which no longer belongs to presence, and has no real origin or source. 
                                                
12 See Hall & Ames 2003, 39, 55-71. 
21 
 
Derrida calls this play of différance temporisation,13 implicitly bringing attention to the 
‘deferral’ aspect of his thought. Presence is always deferred, traces are all we have. The trace 
for Derrida is that which is “[a]lways differing and deferring, the trace is never as it is in the 
presentation of itself. It erases itself in presenting itself, muffles itself in resonating…” 
(Derrida 1982, 23) Trace(s) are thus not to be understood as traces of something deeper or 
behind the appearances of the trace(s): “the trace is not a presence but the simulacrum of a 
presence that dislocates itself, displaces itself, it properly has no site—erasure belongs to its 
structure.” (Derrida 1982, 24) The fact that différance is “the play which makes possible 
nominal effects, the relatively unitary and atomic structures that are called names,” (Derrida 
1982, 26) does not mean that there is something outside of this play that would function as a 
metaphysical guiding principle. The play is all there is. 
When dao is seen in this way, we can no longer refer to dao as a principle, since that 
notion already implies that there is something guiding something else, before something else, 
a presence before the trace. To explain this we could look at chapter 62 of the Daodejing, 
which says that “Way-making (dao) is the flowing together of all things (wanwu).” (Hall & 
Ames 2003, 173, pinyin in original) This passage implies a process thinking which is 
comparable with Derrida’s trace thinking, since there is nothing behind the flowing together 
of things, meaning first of all that there is no guiding principle behind it, and second that all 
things flow together in the sense that they have traces in each other. There are only traces. 
Other chapters of the Daodejing can be read in a similar fashion. Chapter 1 mentions that dao 
is ineffable, but this is not because it would be some metaphysical principle, but because as 
the whole of everything ‘flowing together’, it cannot be given a name without reducing it to 
something within that flow. Chapter 4, 6 and 14 describe dao as elusive, as only seemingly 
there, validating the idea that there is no getting beyond the traces. Further in chapter 21 a 
                                                
13 For example in Derrida 1982, 8. 
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similar position is taken:  
 
As for the process of way-making,  
It is ever so indefinite and vague.  
Though vague and indefinite,  
There are images within it.  
Though indefinite and vague,  
There are events within it. (Hall & Ames 2003, 107) 
 
A metaphysical interpretation of this passage would suggest that behind the appearances 
which are vague and indeterminate, there is a real presence, a sort of Platonic world of 
principles. Reading with Derrida, I see this passage as meaning that within context, only 
differences function and thus only traces are to be found. The context itself is nothing else 
than this play of differences, but within that context there are indeed references or images. 
These references or images however never refer to that full presence suggested by the 
metaphysical tradition.  
In the Zhuangzi chapter 2 states something comparable. Where everything has a “this” 
and a “that,” full presence is repudiated and the way is opened for an understanding that 
focuses on traces. As Zhuangzi says: 
 
There is a beginning. There is a not yet beginning to be a beginning. There is a 
not yet beginning to be a not yet beginning to be a beginning. There is being. 
There is nonbeing. There is a not yet beginning to be nonbeing. There is a not 
yet beginning to be a not yet beginning to be nonbeing. Suddenly there is 
being and nonbeing. But between this being and nonbeing, I don’t really know 
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which is being and which is nonbeing. (Watson 2003, 38) 
 
The play of yin and yang forces important in Daoism suggests that otherness is always 
already there. Yin is always yin becoming yang, and vice versa. There is a continuous process, 
hence we cannot perceive things other than as infinite traces only identifiable within or 
through an ever increasing context. Before the ‘beginning’ there is another ‘beginning’, and 
so on. Thus ‘beginning’ never really refers to some metaphysical principle that started the 
process, but can only make sense from within the process. Outside and inside then become 
categories which are no longer strictly separable. Graham describes this thought in a 
persuasive manner: “Perhaps Lao-tzu’s Way is how the Trace will look to us when we are no 
longer haunted by the ghost of that transcendent Reality the death of which Derrida 
proclaims.” (Graham 1989, 228, italics in original)  
This leads us to the question about the permanence or impermanence of dao. In 
Daoism the process of change takes precedent over any permanent order. Of course some 
patterns endure for a while, there is some permanence to these, yet more importantly the 
focus is on the impermanence of daos. This applies specifically to the relation of man to the 
world, because it is exactly man who seems to forget this impermanence. As Graham notices: 
“It is all right to make fluid distinctions varying with circumstances, it is when we make rigid 
distinctions misleading us into judging that something is permanently what it is temporarily 
convenient to name it that thinking goes wrong.” (Graham 1989, 190) Both Derrida and 
Daoism thus maintain the provisionality of our thought and our language, without that 
leading them to be against thinking and language per se. For example, in many Western 
interpretations of Daoism it is often argued that Daoists in general and Zhuangzi in particular, 
because they understand that language is impermanent, propose to do away with language, 
but I think this is a misunderstanding. One of the passages often invoked in this argument is: 
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The fish trap exists because of the fish; once you’ve gotten the fish, you can 
forget about the trap. The rabbit snare exists because of the rabbit; once 
you’ve gotten the rabbit, you can forget the snare. Words exist because of 
meaning; once you’ve gotten the meaning, you can forget the words. Where 
can I find a man who has forgotten words so I can have a word with him? 
(Watson 2003, 141) 
 
This passage from the Zhuangzi has traditionally and metaphysically been understood as 
saying that we can do without language once we rise to the level of the meaning of ideas. Yet 
from a Derridean perspective we would rather understand this passage as saying we must 
always return to language, even when we think we no longer need it. You can only forget the 
fish trap for a short moment, while you have fish. Once the fish runs out, is exhausted, you 
need the fish trap again, and you might have to do some repairs as well. And the final 
sentence portrays this idea very clearly: “Where can I find a man who has forgotten words so 
I can have a word with him?” You need first to forget about words as having a fixed 
reference, not to leave them behind permanently, but to be able to use them differently. 
Derrida’s idea of the ‘under erasure’, the provisional use of notions, and his insistence on 
inventing new terms and using terms in different ways for a while, and then seemingly letting 
them go, can thus be fruitfully compared to this Daoist insistence of the non-permanence of 
meaning. For example, Derrida has little affinity with the concept ‘deconstruction’, and 
argues that this word should be seen as provisional and “determined by such other words as 
‘ecriture,’ ‘trace,’ ‘differance,’ ‘supplement,’ ‘hymen,’ ‘pharmakon,’ ‘marge,’ ‘entame,’ 
‘parergon,’ etc. By definition, the list can never be closed…” (Derrida in Wood & Bernasconi 
1988, 4) Once a neologism or a word develops into a concept, it loses what original force it 
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had, and the same would go for the notion of dao. Daoists are indeed extremely aware of the 
provisionality of language, examples abound where they talk about the impossibility of 
pinpointing dao, but that does not mean they want to get rid of language. It means foremost 
that Derrida and the Daoists are aware that literal language does not exist, that all language is 
metaphorical in a way, and that reference is provisional. 
Like Derrida, Zhuangzi is aware that words are needed although they resist our 
ambitions to fix their meanings. Derrida and Zhuangzi both acknowledge the constant shifts 
and the need to be skilful in playing with this phenomenon of language. As Graham says, 
Zhuangzi “uses words not like a philosopher but like a poet, sensitive to their richness, 
exploiting their ambiguities, letting conflicting meanings explode against each other in 
apparent contradiction.” (Graham 2001, 26) The point both Zhuangzi and Derrida make is not 
that language is useless and to be discarded, but that we must see and accept its ultimate 
possibilities and thus to reconsider its normal usage. This is exemplified by Zhuangzi saying: 
“Where can I find a man who has forgotten words, so I can have a word with him?” By 
letting words ‘explode’ against each other, by exploiting the fullest range of meanings of any 
term, by bringing out ambiguities and inconsistencies, Derrida and Daoism advocate a use of 
language that seeks to explore it to its fullest possibilities, and this with full awareness of its 
dangers and limitations, rather than discard it.  
For Derrida, language, or ‘writing’, is an essential part of how we experience the 
world. We have seen that Derrida’s “nothing outside the text” means that our lives revolve 
around open-ended contexts and signification structures. As such we are relational at our core 
and revolve around ‘language’ or ‘discourse.’ Ames has put this point with regard to Chinese 
philosophy:  
 
we are nothing more or less than the ongoing and sedimenting aggregate of 
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these various levels of discourse: what we say and hear, what our 
countenances express and how it affects others, what our formal behaviors 
communicate and what they precipitate, what our body language and gestures 
indicate and how they are interpreted, what our voices and songs convey and 
how others are prompted to respond to them. As such, we are the organisms 
that in our doings and undergoings emerge discursively out of these 
performances of ourselves in community. (Ames 2008, 45) 
 
We saw that Zhuangzi says that things “are ties to each other,” meaning that everything is 
related in differential webs, and that language is also such a web, existing only because of 
and by this relationality. Like Derrida, the strategic provocations employed by Zhuangzi are 
not about the total meaninglessness of words but about the mistake of assigning dogmatically 
fixed meanings. Essentially, both Derrida and Zhuangzi are aware that there is no way they 
can ever permanently escape the workings of language, and they accordingly challenge the 
inflexibility of the ways of thinking in which they were brought up.  
 This short ‘application’ of Derrida’s thought is not meant to be exhaustive, but serves 
purely as an example of the usefulness of employing Derrida in comparative philosophy. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
To summarize, we could say the following about Derrida and comparative philosophy. First, 
it is obvious that it is in his work, and not so much in any actual intercultural encounter 
between himself as a thinker and another cultural sphere, that any relevance is to be found. 
And this requires very close reading and a constant awareness of the difficulties and 
implications of what comparative philosophers try to achieve, as well as an awareness that we 
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are almost always reading ‘out of context.’ 
Second, we can use his work for an intercultural understanding by comparing his way 
of thinking with other cultures, if we stay aware of the fact that for Derrida, the words and 
concepts he employs are not ‘transcendental signifieds’ in any way, and that as such, they 
ultimately have no value and are therefore used ‘under erasure.’ Derrida can make us aware 
of the problems surrounding conceptual frameworks and their unavoidable employment in 
comparative philosophy. 
Third, that much of Derrida’s work revolves around dealing with such aporias. But he 
does not deal with them in the sense that Western philosophy has always done, by denying 
them their place and pushing them to the margins of philosophy, but by showing how we 
continuously have to deal with them, with the contamination and infusion of what is other 
into what is considered the self. This ambiguity is not a bad thing, it is the possibility for not 
closing off our understanding to things different, and it is always there. Derrida then tries to 
think relationality, the in-between. Not avoiding this ultimate relationality, but giving full 
justice to it, is also what comparative philosophy is about, and it is thus that a close reading of 
Derrida can help comparative thinking in how to approach thinking in other cultures.  
Lastly, ‘applying’ Derrida to a different way of thought, in this case classical Daoism, 
might yield fruitful results in that it gives us better tools to set aside the usual metaphysical 
lenses we have.14 
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